Outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 occurred previously for three consecutive years, 2006, 2007 and 2008 in Kano State, Nigeria, causing heavy economic losses to farmers and the government. It was against this background that risk factors for the occurrence and spread of HPAI H5N1 among commercial poultry farms in the State were evaluated. A total of 64 farms comprising 32 affected (AF) and 32 non-affected (NAF) farms were enrolled for this study. Questionnaires were designed and administered to the selected farms through interviews with farm owners or farm managers during on-site visits. Information on flock profile including farm characteristics and environment, husbandry practices, biosecurity practices, farm trade practices and employee activities were obtained and analyzed. Pearson Chi square and Fisher's exact tests were used to compare categorical variables. Values of p< 0.05 were considered significant. Odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated to measure the strength and statistical significance of associations between the variables and occurrence and spread of HPAI H5N1 in commercial poultry farms in the State. The most significant risk factors were the presence of untreated surface water on farms (OR 18.6, 95%CI 2.24 -154.34, p = 0.001), exchange of egg crates between traders and farmers (OR 12.1, 95%CI 1.43 -102.61, p = 0.006), allowing egg crates of traders into poultry pens (OR 11.67,, p = 0.001) and allowing rodents/wild birds access to poultry feed (OR 3.65, p = 0.024). It was recommended that veterinary inspection to enforce and encourage best biosecurity practices for the poultry farms should be introduced and sustained.
Introduction
Nigeria was the first country in Africa to be affected by the Avian Influenza (AI) type A H5N1 virus, with HPAI outbreaks initially reported at a commercial farm in Kaduna State in January, 2006 (Adene et al., 2006 Fusaro et al., 2009; Ekong et al., 2012) . Between 2006 and 2008, a total of 1, 654 suspected outbreaks were reported from 32 of the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), of which 299 were confirmed to be HPAI H5N1 positive from 27 states and FCT (Ekong et al., 2012; Henning et al., 2012) . Considering the previous outbreaks in Asia, Africa, and Europe, the AI H5N1 virus still represents a global threat for the poultry industry (FAO, 2004) .
The spread of AI subtype H5N1 virus infection in Asia and beyond poses threats to both human and animal health (Morris & Jackson, 2005) . However, little reliable epidemiologic data exists on the routes of AI H5N1 virus transmission and perpetuation in poultry within affected countries (Kung et al., 2007) . These countries do not have the capacity to effectively manage, eliminate and control animal diseases, and humans generally live closely with poultry (Joannis et al., 2006) . To minimize the risk of AI H5N1 virus incursion at poultry farm level, it is important to investigate and assess the risk status of poultry farms and to communicate this to the farmers.
Although, studies on HPAI H5N1 risk factors have been conducted in Nigeria (Fasina et al., 2011; Metras et al., 2012) , data on biosecurity practices and contacts in poultry farms in Kano State are rare. The present study aims to complement previous reports on risk factors and further define their roles in the occurrence and spread of HPAI H5N1 in commercial poultry farms in Kano State. 
Materials and methods

Areas of the study
Sample Size and Sampling Technique
Based on the assumption of a worst case scenario that 50% of the farms being investigated may have HPAI problems (Salman et al., 2007) , 64 commercial poultry farms comprising 32 affected (AF) and 32 non affected (NAF) farms were selected by simple random sampling (through balloting) from a list of 128 registered poultry farms obtained from Avian Influenza Control Project (AICP) office, Kano and enrolled for this study.
Questionnaire Design and Administration
A questionnaire developed and designed for this study was first pretested at five farms (However, the farms were not subsequently used in the study). The questionnaire was then modified according to new variables encountered during prestesting. In the final questionnaire, 57 variables covering information about farm characteristics and environment, husbandry practices, biosecurity measures employed on the farm, feed and water sources and employee activities, farm trade practices and employee protection were evaluated. The questionnaires were administered to farm owners or managers through interviews during on-site visits. Personal observations of farm premises and activities were used to validate the responses of the respondents during the questionnaire administration. The non affected farms were first visited for biosecurity reasons.
Data Analysis
Data obtained from the 64 registered commercial farms were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software package, version 15 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Pearson Chi square (X 2 ) and Fisher's exact tests were used to compare categorical variables. Values of p≤ 0.05 were considered significant. Odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated to measure the strength and statistical significance of associations between risk factors and HPAI occurrence.
Results
The most significant risk factor associated with farm characteristics and environment for AI H5N1 occurrence was the presence of untreated surface water on farms, which had the strongest point estimate of risk (odds ratio (OR) 18.6), and a high statistical significance (p = 0.001), despite a wide 95% confidence interval (CI) of 2.24-154.34 (Table 1) Table 4 ). The study also revealed that some factors may pose significant risks for human infection with AI H5N1 viruses among workers in the poultry farms. These include non use of farm-specific clothes (OR 2.70, 95% CI 0.63-11.59, p = 0.018), non wearing of hand gloves during farm operation (OR 1.56, 95% CI 0.16 -1.93, p = 0.051), non use of face mask during operation (OR 1.44, 95% CI 0.43-4.77, p = 0.015) and non washing of hands before and after farm operations (OR 1.73, CI 025-2.19, p = 0.008). The aforementioned risks were all higher in the AF farms (Table 5 ). This study revealed that 29 (51%) of the 57 risk factors evaluated were significant (p≤0.05). Based on the principles of biosecurity, 21(72.4%) of the 29 significant risk factors were observed in the AF farms; with 6 (20.7%), 5 (17.2%) and 10 (34.5%) associated with isolation, traffic control and sanitation, respectively (Table 6 ). Based on behavioral practices and physical infrastructure, 22 (75.9%) of the 29 significant factors were also observed in the AF farms; with 16 (55.2%) and 6 (20.7%) associated with behavioral practices and physical infrastructure, respectively (Table 7) . 
Discussion
In view of the fact that this study was conducted in 2009, 2 years after HPAI H5N1 was first reported in Nigeria, it is expected that the AF farms would have improved in their biosecurity practices. However, the finding that these farms were at very high risk of contracting the disease implies that there was no veterinary inspection to enforce or encourage best biosecurity practices after the outbreaks, despite the rigorous prevention and control campaign embarked upon by the Nigerian government and other international organizations against HPAI. Untreated surface water in farms was considered to be the most significant risk factor likely to contribute to the occurrence of AI H5N1 in the commercial poultry farms studied. The roles of untreated surface water, which is mostly contaminated, and could come from an AI-infected premise causing transmission to another premise, have been reported (Power, 2005) . The possible risks could be; run-off from infected premises may enter either surface or ground water and might travel in ditches downstream to another uninfected premise possibly carrying along AI H5N1 viruses in washed-off manure that was spread onto agricultural fields, depopulation, removal or composting of infected carcasses (Cardona, 2007) . It is important to note that AI H5N1 viruses have been isolated from surface water in Canada and Minnesota, and contaminated surface water has been suggested as a short and long term source of AI viruses for domestic birds (Hinshaw et al., 1979; Halvorson et al., 1985) . The observation that most of the commercial poultry farms were located close to the metropolitan area of Kano State, in eight of the 12
LGAs enrolled for this study, might be explained by the fact that these farms were sited to be in close proximity to the Kano main market, for easy channeling of products. This has resulted in the creation of high density of poultry farms in the area, particularly Kumbotso L.G.A. Consequently, this might have been responsible for the high frequency of outbreaks reported in the area (AICP, 2008) . The finding that the AF farms were more concentrated in one area when compared with NAF farms is consistent with previous reports that high density of poultry farms in an area could be a risk factor for the introduction and maintenance of AI H5N1 (Kung et al., 2007; Swayne, 2008) . The observation that there was a risk associated with relying on intermediaries (distributors) or the so called "middlemen" for the supply of day-old chicks or point-of-lay hens is consistent with the report of Desvaux et al. (2010) who confirmed the role of poultry movement and trading activities by middlemen as significant risk factor for the occurrence of AI H5N1 in Vietnam. Of particular concern were those intermediaries, because they may mix birds from different sources and distribute them to different locations. In some cases, these mixing nodes may be important for spreading of AI viruses to different farms (FAO, 2008) . The finding that vaccination of chickens against HPAI was also found to be a highly significant risk factor and may likely contribute to the occurrence of the disease may be explained by a few reasons. Firstly, it has been reported that vaccination of chickens against the disease with inactivated oil emulsion influenza vaccines is known to prevent influenza disease signs and reduce virus shedding and spread. However, the vaccines do not induce sterilizing immunity in chickens, for a number of potential reasons, including lack of antigenic match between the vaccine and circulating strain of the virus, and insufficient viral antigen in the vaccine (Karunakaran et al., 1987; Swayne et al., 2001; Webster et al., 2006) . The implication is that vaccinated birds may be protected when infected with the viruses, but may continue to shed the viruses in the environment. Susceptible birds may be infected with the field viruses, and may exhibit clinical signs (Capua & Marangon, 2003) . Secondly, eventhough vaccination of poultry against HPAI has been useful in some countries in preventing infection and controlling the epizootic through limited spread in domestic poultry, no country that has employed it extensively has yet been able to eliminate the viruses (FAO, 2008) . While vaccination is certainly a useful tool in the control of HPAI, it is never likely to be sufficient on its own to eradicate the disease. Besides, vaccination of whole populations of poultry requires political commitment and investment and this is difficult to maintain in the long term (FAO, 2008) . It is important to note that the long-term circulation of the AI H5N1 viruses in a vaccinated population may result in both antigenic and genetic changes in the virus and this has been reported to have occurred in Mexico (Escorcia et al., 2008) . The non restriction of staff to specific pens may encourage cross-infection between pens, as a staff may carry infection from an infected to an uninfected pen. This may be explained by the fact that, most frequently, the clothes, shoes and hands of these staff may be contaminated with dust, feathers, and excrement containing AI H5N1 viruses and may be carried to pens (Cardona, 2007; Cardona, 2008) . Of particular concern is the risk for the occurrence and spread of AI H5N1 viruses through poultry litter. It is important to note that the practice of accumulating poultry litter (which is mostly used as manure meant for crop farming or sold to crop farmers) is common among the poultry farms in Kano State. The implication is that, accumulated manure might serve as a source for AI H5N1 viruses. Given that large quantities of AI H5N1 viruses are shed in the faeces of infected poultry, an emerging market for poultry manure as fertilizer may also facilitate the rapid spread of AI H5N1 viruses from farm to farm (Power, 2005) . It has been reported that AI H5N1 viruses could survive for many weeks in wet poultry manure at cool temperatures (4 o C), and for up to 10 days at 25 o C (Power, 2005) . The concentration of the AI H5N1 viruses shed in poultry faeces is usually very high. Consequently, spread of AI H5N1 viruses through contaminated manure from infected premises to a separate susceptible flock could occur through the movement of people, equipment, vehicles and wild birds (e.g egrets) (Power, 2005) . The finding that highly significant risks for the spread of AI H5N1 were associated with allowing egg crates of traders into pens and the exchange of egg crates between traders and farmers is consistent with previous reports that egg crates were found to be significant risk for the spread of AI H5N1 viruses between farms (Thomas et al., 2005) . It has been reported that AI H5N1 viruses may be found on egg crates and outer surfaces and inside of egg shells (Cardona, 2007) . The transfer of eggs on crates contaminated with AI H5N1 viruses is a potential means of spreading of HPAI between farms that allow both entry and exchange of egg crates (Power, 2005; Cardona, 2007) . The significant risk observed for human infection with AI H5N1 viruses through non washing of hands before and after farm operations among commercial poultry workers is consistent with previous reports (Dinh et al., 2006) . Although AI type A H5N1 viruses rarely infect humans, it is important to mention that as at October 7, 2011, 331 (58.6%) of 565 persons infected with the viruses and have died of the disease in 15 countries of the world (one in Nigeria and 52 in Egypt) between January, 2003 to July, 2011 (WHO, 2012 . The virus is excreted in the droppings of infected birds and their respiratory secretions (Dinh et al., 2006) . Transmission to humans could occur through contact with infected sick or dead poultry or their droppings, or contact with contaminated litter or surfaces (e.g egg crates) (Anonymous, 2004; ESFA, 2005) . The possible routes of entry of the virus into humans are the mouth, nose, eyes and lungs (Dinh et al., 2006) . The report that relatively high rates of H5 and H9 antibody seroprevalence was recorded among Hong Kong poultry workers have highlighted the potential for AI H5N1 viruses to transmit to unprotected humans, particularly those with occupational exposure (Dinh et al., 2006) . Such transmission may increase the likelihood of reassortment between a currently circulating human virus and an avian virus and thus the possible creation of a strain with pandemic potential. It is pertinent to mention that all reported human cases have coincided with outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in poultry (Mohan et al., 2008) . The presence of water reservoirs which was observed to be higher in the AF farms may contribute to the occurrence of HPAI H5N1 outbreak. It has been reported that these water reservoirs are sometimes shared by domestic ducks and generally ducks on backyard farms feed on nearby reservoirs of water, predominantly, ponds made by the poultry farmers for household purposes or for aquaculture (Biswas et al., 2009 ). The implication is that these water reservoirs might become contaminated with AI H5N1 viruses by virusshedding ducks that congregate at these places to feed on vegetation, small fish and amphibians that may be found in the water (Desvaux et al., 2010) . The presence of dense vegetation and tall trees could indirectly present the risk for the occurrence of AI H5N1 among the poultry farms in view of the fact that these aforementioned places could provide conducive homes and roosting places for rodents and wild birds. It has been reported that wild birds represent a reservoir for AI H5N1 viruses worldwide (Deogu et al., 2003; Hoye et al., 2010) . This is a concern because many of the birds are migratory and travel over long distances across international borders (Hoye et al., 2010) . Wild birds have been shown to introduce novel influenza gene segments into a population, that when reassorted with existing viruses can generate a dissimilar virus with different antigenic and other biological characteristics (Biswas et al., 2009 ). Looking at epidemiological data currently available, evidence is mounting that wild birds may play an important role in the AI H5N1 cycle and could be the initial source for some AI H5N1 viruses which may be passed on through contact with resident water fowl or poultry, particularly domestic ducks (Biswas et al., 2009) . In the event of low pathogenic viruses, the virus can undergo mutation or re-assort with viruses in the domestic and possibly resident bird populations until HPAI occurs (Biswas et al., 2009) . The role of these wild birds could be complicated by the fact that the control of HPAI H5N1 in wild bird populations may not be feasible from logistical, environmental and biodiversity points of view (Biswas et al., 2009) . Epidemiological studies have suggested that wild birds can play a role in the transmission of AI H5N1 viruses to domestic poultry and vice versa (Deogu et al., 2003) . There was evidence of a relationship between the risk of rodents and wild birds accessing poultry feed and the occurrence of AI H5N1 in poultry farms and this is consistent with previous reports (Power, 2005) . Rodents might contaminate feed and litter with their excrement containing the AI H5N1 viruses (Cardona, 2007) . They are particularly important to disease control, because they are frequently infected with disease-causing organisms and can perpetuate the organisms on a farm (Zander et al., 1997) . The presence of free range birds and water fowls (local chickens, domestic ducks, geese, pigeons) was found to be a significant risk factor and this was recognized previously as a risk factor for HPAI occurrence, possibly due to their potential role as a reservoir of infection (Webster et al., 1997; Gilbert et al., 2006; Paul et al., 2010; Ferro et al., 2010) . Infected domestic ducks may exhibit no clinical signs, yet can excrete high concentrations of AI H5N1 viruses that are pathogenic to other poultry species (Wakawa et al., 2008; Henning et al., 2010) . It has been reported that the possible risk factors for AI H5N1 spread in Indonesia include duck movements, contacts between ducks and other poultry and inadequate handling of sick or dead ducks by flock owners (Henning et al, 2009; Henning et al., 2010) . Similarly, scavenging ducks have been implicated as important contributors to HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry flocks in South-east Asia (Thanawat et al., 2005) . In similar studies, available evidence indicated that free-range domestic birds (chickens, ducks, guinea fowls and pigeons), played an important role in the spread of HPAI H5N1 in Vietnam and Thailand. In the case of pigeons, the risk factor of contact with pigeons included two categories: the owner's own domestic pigeons and neighbours' visiting pigeons. It is important to note that keeping pigeons alongside commercial poultry is a common practice among some poultry farmers in Kano State. The implication is pigeons' feeding and behaviour could probably allow them to come in close contact with the secretions of HPAI-infected or dead chickens or with fomites, enabling them to transmit the virus (Chalmers, 2005; Biswas et al., 2009) . The practice of keeping birds of different ages was significant. The implication is that, multiple ages on the same premise may constitute a serious disease potential from both actively infected birds and recovered carriers, particularly if birds of differing ages are closely associated through management practices or proximity (Zander et al., 1997) . The finding that allowing free access to poultry pens, non restriction of visitors and parking vehicles close to poultry pens might pose significant risk for the occurrence of AI H5N1 is consistent with previous reports (Cardona & Kuney, 2002; Cardona, 2007; Cardona, 2008; Henning et al., 2010) . Because of their mobility, duties, curiosity, ignorance, indifference, carelessness or total concentration on current profit margin, humans constitute one of the greatest potential causes of the introduction of disease (Power, 2005) . Rarely is this because they become infected and shed the disease agent, but rather because they track infectious agents, use contaminated equipment, or manage their flocks in such a way that spread of disease is inevitable (Power, 2005) . Poultry catchers and egg traders that were allowed to wear the same clothing between farms and also allowed to enter poultry farms were considered to be significant risks. The implication is that their contaminated clothes and shoes might mechanically spread the AI H5N1 viruses from infected to uninfected premises (EFSA, 2005; Power, 2005) . The significant risk associated with the method of dead bird disposal by refuse dump in this study is also consistent with previous reports (Cardona & Kuney, 2002) . The danger is, infected dead birds may be fed upon by wild birds, domestic free roaming birds, cats or dogs. It has been reported that the disposal in the environment of dead birds may raise an additional risk for AI H5N1 spread, particularly for farming systems characterized by free-roaming birds, given tendencies toward predation and/or cannibalism (FAO, 2006) . The report that domestic cats and dogs can be infected if they feed on infected chickens has also fueled concerns about the risk that AI H5N1 virus poses to cats and dogs, and subsequently to humans who have direct contact with them (Richard, 2006; Pilaipan, 2010) . In conclusion, the risks for the occurrence of HPAI H5N1 are higher in AF than NAF farms. The AF farms have not improved in their biosecurity practices despite their previous experiences with outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in the State and government's campaign against the disease. It is recommended that veterinary inspection to enforce and encourage best biosecurity practices for poultry farms should be introduced and sustained. 
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